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THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL DEBT 
IN THE FDI-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP 
 
by Sailesh Tanna, Chengchun Li, and Glauco De Vita 
 




This paper investigates the relevance of external debt as a factor inhibiting economic growth 
gains to be accrued from foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a model which 
formalises a mechanism to allow for the influence of external debt in the transmission of FDI-
generated externalities and conduct threshold regressions to test the existence of a debt 
contingency effect which limits the positive impact of inward FDI on growth. Using annual as 
well as five-year averaged data for 39 developing countries over the period 1984-2010, our 
findings support the hypothesis that FDI-induced growth is dependent on the external debt 
constraint. In particular, we show that beyond a certain threshold high indebtedness constrains 
economies from reaping growth benefits from FDI as they seek to reduce their debt levels. In 
this scenario, the evidence also shows that increasing financial development can mitigate the 
negative influence of high external debt on the FDI-growth nexus. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
It is now generally recognised that foreign direct investment (FDI) brings growth benefits to 
developing countries depending on the absorptive capacity of these economies to assimilate 
gains from technology transfer and spillover effects (Alfaro et al., 2004; Durham, 2004). 
While a burgeoning literature examines the importance of specific factors that influence host 
countries’ absorptive capacity and explores a variety of explicit thresholds as contingencies in 
the FDI-growth nexus - in particular the importance of financial development and 
institutional environment – these issues are investigated while largely ignoring the constraint 
on growth that a country’s debt burden could conceivably impose. But could there be a role 
of external debt in preventing economic growth gains from FDI? That is the question we take 
up in this paper. 
 Many developing countries have continually experienced a serious debt overhang 
problem since the 1980s, as a result of relying on borrowing from abroad to finance their 
domestic investments (World Bank, 2016). Attempts to restructure their debt obligations with 
foreign creditors have led to slower economic growth of these economies due to painful 
macroeconomic adjustments (see, e.g. Krugman et al., 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). In 
this paper we argue that a debt contingency effect may limit the potential for such economies 
to extract growth-enhancing benefits from inward FDI. Indeed, the graphical representations 
of the ratio of net FDI inflows to GDP plotted against the economic growth of the 39 
developing countries that make up our sample over the period 1984-2010 (Figure 1), 
disaggregated according to low and high indebtedness levels (Panel ‘a’ and ‘b’, respectively), 
show that the FDI-growth relationship is considerably weaker for countries with a high level 
of external debt. We take this empirical regularity to provide a stark stylised fact that 
motivates our study.  
 In the quest for specific factors that influence the absorptive capacity of host countries, 
previous studies have advanced hypotheses in relation to a variety of explicit thresholds. For 




with a sufficiently high level of per capita income being necessary to ensure that FDI 
positively affects economic growth. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) find that the degree of 
trade openness provides a critical threshold for FDI to induce higher growth. Borensztein et 
al. (1998) emphasise that only countries meeting a minimum level of human capital can 
benefit from FDI-led growth gains. More recently, Slesman et al. (2015) present robust 
evidence that portfolio equity (including FDI) and debt inflows have a positive impact on 
economic growth only in countries with high-quality institutions. Countries that fall below 
the identified threshold level of institutional quality record either negative or insignificant 
effects. Other studies suggest that variables such as financial market development, economic 
freedom as well as corruption could also constitute threshold factors affecting the FDI-growth 
nexus (see, among others, Alfaro et al., 2004; Azman-Saini et al., 2010a, 2010b; Hermes & 
Lensink, 2003; Okada & Samreth, 2014). 
 A separate strand of literature investigates the link between foreign debt and economic 
growth in the form a ‘debt Laffer curve’, pointing to a nonlinear relationship incorporating 
both a growth enhancing effect at lower levels of debt and a growth retarding effect (the 
overhang problem) at higher levels of debt (Cohen, 1993, 1995; Krugman, 1988; Pattillo et 
al., 2004; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). Given the nonlinearity of this relationship, the literature 
has also empirically explored whether a debt threshold exists in the debt-growth relation 
using various modelling strategies (Cordella et al., 2010; Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015; 
Kumar & Woo, 2010).  
However, to date, no study has considered the importance of an external debt threshold 
effect in the FDI-growth relationship. Yet, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) demonstrate in 
their book, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, a high level of 
indebtedness increases the sovereign risk of a country, which may limit the volume of FDI 
inflows as multinational enterprises (MNEs) seek safer environments elsewhere to avoid 
potential expropriation of their resources. Moreover, governments are inclined to generate 




which can affect MNEs’ incentives to interact with host country firms or intermediaries, 
thereby limiting the capacity of the host economy to accrue growth benefits from FDI.   
 Given the liability of countries to meet their foreign debt obligations, we argue that their 
ability to reap growth benefits from inward FDI might be contingent on their external 
indebtedness, in addition to other economic factors influencing absorptive capacity such as 
financial development. Our analysis attempts to reconcile the conflicting roles of debt and 
FDI in the process of economic development while accounting for the possibility that certain 
threshold conditions have to be met before growth benefits can be accrued from FDI. In 
particular, we posit that inward FDI promotes economic growth below a certain threshold of 
external debt but otherwise the growth benefits diminish beyond that level. In this process, 
we also highlight a role for financial development in terms of enhancing the capability of FDI 
to promote growth, thereby mitigating the negative influence of the debt constraint.  
In specifying this inherently nonlinear FDI-growth relationship, we develop a theoretical 
model that, allowing for the influence of external debt through a mechanism which supports 
the view that governments use financial repression as a means for liquidating debt (Reinhart 
et al., 2011; but see also Reinhart, 2012, and Reinhart & Sbrancia, 2015), illustrates how 
financial repression affects the FDI-growth relationship and, consequently, the relevance of 
an external debt contingency effect in the relationship through this mechanism. Next, using 
Hansen’s threshold estimation methods (Caner & Hansen, 2004; Hansen, 2000) and 
controlling for a well-established set of growth determinants, we test the implications of our 
theoretical model on country level panel data for 39 developing countries over the period 
1984-2010. We find a threshold level of external debt to be around 61-69 percent of GDP 
(consistent across different models) below which FDI exerts a positive and significant effect 
on economic growth. However, the growth-enhancing effect of FDI diminishes when 
economies face an increasing burden of external debt that goes beyond that tipping point. The 
external debt threshold effect is non-existent in financially more developed regimes relative 
to financially under-developed regimes, implying that increasing financial development 




Our analysis makes a significant contribution to what has gone before since we are the 
first to present evidence of the existence of an external debt threshold which, as a result of 
unfavourable local economic conditions (debt overhang) and consequent financial repression, 
indexes the FDI-growth relationship. We also show that the negative influence of debt in the 
transmission of growth-inducing FDI effects can be alleviated by enhancing the host 
country’s absorptive capacity through greater financial development.  
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. 
Section 3 develops a model of FDI-debt-growth. Section 4 outlines the methodological 
approach for empirical testing. Section 5 presents the data and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 | A SYNTHESIS OF RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 | Thresholds in the FDI-growth nexus 
Theoretical studies tend to emphasise the importance of achieving a minimum threshold level 
of development for economic growth gains to be accrued (Azariadis & Drazen, 1990) while 
empirical studies test the existence of threshold effects in regressions using various proxies 
for absorptive capacity. One such proxy is the level of financial development which is 
considered to be important in the process of technological diffusion associated with FDI. 
Hermes and Lensink (2003) develop a model which predicts that the impact of FDI on 
growth is contingent on the development of host country financial markets. Their empirical 
evidence using cross-section and panel data for 67 developing countries suggests that FDI has 
a positive growth impact if the financial system is sufficiently developed. Alfaro et al. (2004) 
also emphasise the importance of local financial development by examining the effect of FDI 
on economic growth using cross-country data covering up to 71 countries over the period 
1975-1995. They find that while the relationship between FDI and growth is ambiguous, the 




of FDI with financial development, and conclude that the development of local financial 
markets is crucial in ensuring that FDI inflows have a positive impact on growth. 
 There are also studies suggesting that other factors such as human capital, economic 
freedom, institutional quality as well as corruption could be relevant thresholds in the 
relationship between FDI and growth. Borensztein et al. (1998) examine the importance of 
human capital in the relationship between FDI and per capita GDP growth using data for 69 
developing counties over the period 1970-1989. They find that FDI contributes to growth 
only when the host country meets a minimum threshold level of human capital. Following 
Borensztein et al. (1998), other studies also investigate the importance of the threshold effect 
of human capital. Using data for States in the USA, Ford et al. (2008) find that FDI affects 
output growth if the States meet a minimum level of human capital. Using time-series data 
from 10 ASEAN countries over the period 1990-2008, Tu et al. (2012) also find a positive 
impact of FDI on economic growth when human capital is above a threshold level; otherwise 
FDI is more likely to erode growth as it tends to utilise local cheap labour and crowd out 
domestic investment. 
 More recent studies focus on the importance of other factors affecting the FDI-growth 
nexus. Taking economic freedom as a threshold, Azman-Saini et al. (2010b) use system 
GMM estimation with interaction effects in cross-country growth regressions for 85 countries 
over the period 1976-2004. They show that a country can gain significantly from FDI when it 
has a sufficiently high degree of economic freedom. Okada and Samreth (2014) consider the 
influence of corruption in the estimation of the FDI-growth regression using an interaction 
model and find that the threshold is around the 10th percentile of the least corrupt countries in 
their large sample of 130 countries over the period 1995-2008. The impact of FDI on 
economic growth is negative if the corruption level is below the threshold but positive if the 
corruption level is above the threshold. In other words, a high level of corruption is 
associated with a positive impact of FDI on growth. They rationalise this counter-intuitive 
result by arguing that profit-seeking MNEs engage in FDI in countries with weak regulations 




 A common limitation of the modelling specification adopted in the above studies pertains 
to the inclusion of multiplicative interaction terms in linear regressions, which implicitly 
imposes the a priori assumption that FDI monotonically rises (or declines) with absorptive 
capacity (Girma, 2005). Hansen (1996, 2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004) propose 
alternative estimation procedures which avoid the use of interaction terms. Applying Hansen-
type methodology, Kim et al. (2013) use data for 85 countries over the period 1975-2010 to 
show that per capita income, human capital, financial development and corruption serve as 
effective thresholds in the positive impact of trade and FDI on domestic investment. 
Interestingly, they find that trade has an adverse effect on domestic investment in countries 
which lack sufficient absorptive capacity but FDI positively affects investment in countries 
with poor financial development, low human capital or a high level of corruption. Azman-
Saini et al. (2010a) also apply Hansen’s method with cross-country data from 91 countries 
over the period 1975-2005 to confirm that the positive effect of FDI on economic growth 
“kicks in” only if financial development is above a certain threshold. Huang et al. (2012) use 
Hansen’s threshold estimations on provincial data for China over the period 1985-2008 and 
find that the level of regional innovation can be a threshold in the transmission effect from 
FDI to growth. 
 
2.2 | The relevance of debt for investment and economic growth  
Turning to debt issues, conventional wisdom suggests that foreign borrowing is an important 
source of finance for investment particularly in developing economies. As Todaro and Smith 
(2011) note, a large accumulation of foreign debt is particularly common in the early stages 
of economic development, when there are low levels of domestic savings, high current 
account deficits, and/or lack of capital imports. However, following the Third World Debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, many developing countries suffered from a serious problem of debt 
overhang. Krugman (1988) argues that debt overhang occurs when the expected repayment 




expected to exceed the country’s capability of future repayment, then expected debt service is 
likely to be an increasing function of the country’s output level. Some of the returns from 
investing in the domestic economy are effectively taxed away by foreign creditors, thus 
discouraging further investment. Furthermore, a high debt burden increases expectations that 
debt will tend to be financed by distortionary measures (e.g. financial repression or other 
punitive taxes or expenditure cuts), leading to lower or riskier investment, greater uncertainty 
about future returns, and potentially lower growth prospects (Calvo, 1998; Clements et al., 
2003). 
Numerous empirical studies have sought to provide evidence of the debt overhang 
hypothesis by testing the effect of debt on investment (Aguiar et al., 2009; Cohen, 1993) and 
growth (Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010) with the aim of determining 
debt thresholds to convey nonlinear effects in the implied relationship. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010), for example, investigate the systematic relationship between debt, growth and 
inflation using a unique dataset covering 44 countries with 200 years of historical data 
incorporating more than 3,700 country-year observations. Their primary findings indicate that 
public debt undermines economic growth beyond a threshold of 90 percent of GDP for 
advanced countries while the corresponding threshold of external debt to GDP for emerging 
economies is 60 percent. As recently noted by De Vita et al. (2018), Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
conclusion of a debt threshold of 90 percent of GDP above which countries experience a 
substantial decline in their GDP growth rate did not escape criticism, prompting a major 
controversy (see, e.g. Herndon et al., 2014).1 Yet, Reinhart and Rogoff showed in subsequent 
papers (see Reinhart et al., 2012) that the growth rate in regimes of high debt, while positive, 
was still much lower than in regimes of low debt. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Herndon et al. (2014) provided a strong critique to Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) claim of a 90 percent threshold, pointing 
to coding errors and less than adequate data selection and methodological choices. In their replication Herndon et al. (2014) 
found that over 1946-2009, countries with public debt/GDP ratios above 90 percent averaged 2.2 percent real annual GDP 






2.3 | Identifying a mechanism by which debt acts as a threshold in FDI-induced growth 
 
While the aforementioned studies have emphasised the effects of debt on investment or 
economic growth, and there have been also a few studies comparing elements of debt and 
FDI as ingredients of growth (Chung, 2010; Nicholson & Lane, 2013), attempts to explicitly 
characterise the debt-FDI-GDP growth nexus at either theoretical or empirical level have not 
been previously reported in the literature. In an attempt to identify possible mechanisms 
through which a country’s indebtedness level could act as a threshold in the FDI-growth link, 
we draw - as our starting point - from three arguments that have been presented in the 
literature.  
First, debt servicing costs eat up a major proportion of a country’s foreign exchange 
earnings and, while capital inflows contribute to the build-up of foreign exchange reserves, 
depletion of such resources can undermine macroeconomic stability and growth (Corden, 
1989). In this scenario, Ahlquist and Prakash (2010) demonstrate the importance of a debt 
threshold effect in the relationship between FDI and the costs of contract enforcement 
(typically between private actors such as MNEs and local entrepreneurs), arguing that highly 
indebted countries are vulnerable to FDI inflows. Using cross-country data for 98 developing 
countries over the period 1992-2002, they find that FDI inflows contribute to reducing the 
costs of contract enforcement as long as the level of external debt is below the threshold. 
Since contract enforcement is a relevant institutional characteristic (backed by rule of law) 
which facilitates private transactions that may ultimately drive economic growth, their 
analysis suggests an intuitive way of treating the external indebtedness of the host economy 
as a relevant constraint in analysing the growth benefits associated with inward FDI.  
 A second possible mechanism stems from the sovereign risk argument. In analysing the 
salient features of financial crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) shed light on the possible 
debt-FDI-growth link by pointing out the importance of sovereign risk in the location 




possibility that a debt-defaulting country might expropriate their plant and equipment.2 Bayar 
and Kilic’s (2014) empirical study for Turkey confirms that sovereign credit ratings (where 
external debt level is a crucial element for the ratings) influence FDI inflows. Earlier, 
Nunnenkamp (1991) suggested that sovereign risk and debt overhang were relevant factors in 
explaining the decline of FDI to developing countries during the 1980s. Although the 
presence of increased sovereign risk might suggest a possible reason why external debt could 
affect foreign investment (including FDI) flows, this alone may not be a convincing case in 
itself for considering debt as a threshold barrier in the FDI-growth nexus.  
A final possible mechanism - which we develop formally in the full-blown model 
presented in the next section - could stem from the financial repression argument. The 
concept of financial repression was initially proposed by McKinnon (1973), who defined it as 
government policies capping interest rates, setting high reserve requirements on bank 
deposits, and compulsorily allocating resources. Such repressive policies, commonly used in 
developed countries but especially developing ones, tend to impede financial deepening and 
hinder efficiency of the financial system. As such, they are expected to impact economic 
growth negatively (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973).  
    We argue that governments opting for financial repression policies to manage public debt 
servicing may signal a desire to obtain rents from the financial system and foreign assets 
returns, thus creating investment disincentives for MNEs because the rates of return are lower 
than what could be obtained in a competitive market. This may induce a tipping point (or 
threshold) in the level of indebtedness beyond which, as a result of this financial repression 
mechanism, the transmission of FDI-generated externalities - and hence FDI-induced growth 
- is negatively affected. 
 In the next section, we develop a formal model of this mechanism, the inferences from 
which we then test empirically. As noted earlier, attempts to explicitly characterise the debt-
                                                 
2 In history, this kind of expropriation is not rare. For example, the Chilean government confiscated the US copper mining 




FDI-GDP growth nexus at either theoretical or empirical level are absent in existing 
literature. This paper makes a unique contribution in these directions. 
 
3 | A THEORETICAL MODEL 
Our model has two features. First, in line with the view espoused by Reinhart et al. (2011) 
among others, it highlights the relation between external debt and financial repression; 
second, it illustrates how financial repression affects the FDI-growth relationship and, as a 
consequence, how external debt can affect the relationship through this mechanism.  
 To establish the link between financial repression and external debt, we draw from the 
model originally developed by Giovannini and de Melo (1991, 1993) who show how 
financial repression, like tax, exerts a negative impact on per capita growth. Their analysis of 
consumer optimisation is based on the overlapping generations (OLG) model used by 
Blanchard (1985). They show that governments can raise their revenue by levying an implicit 
tax 𝜃 (financial repression) on foreign asset (F) returns, thereby proportionally reducing the 
interest paid on domestic debt (D). Financial repression thus exerts a wedge (distortion) 
which drives the domestic interest rate (r) below the world interest rate (𝑟∗), giving the 
relationship (Appendix I outlines the full structure of the model with derivation of this and 
subsequent relationships below):  
 
(1 + 𝑟∗)(1 − 𝜃) = 1 + 𝑟      (1) 
 
Assume that government revenue from the financial repression tax is set equal to the 
government expenditure (G) on domestic and foreign debts, so that 𝐺 = 𝜃(𝐹 + 𝐷). 
Moreover, rather than rely on levying a tax on private agents’ income from investing in 
foreign assets, governments exercise the means of financial repression to affect foreign 
investment by driving a wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates. Assuming that 




government’s budget constraint can be represented as 𝐸 + 𝐷 = 𝜃𝐷. Normalising 
government expenditure to be unity, the relationship between financial repression and 





       (2) 
 
The implication of this model is that with high levels of external indebtedness, governments 
tend to rely more on the means of financial repression to reduce the burden of their external 
debt, particularly when they cannot easily raise revenue from other formal levies to repay the 
debt.  
Turning to the relationship between FDI and economic growth, we use a classical Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. Following Kinoshita and Lu 
(2006) and Hsu and Wu (2006), we assume that technological progress in the domestic 
economy is driven by the international diffusion of foreign technology, measured as a 
function of FDI, which yields the following relationship characterising technological change: 
 
𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑡 + (𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) − 𝐴𝑡)𝜑(𝑘𝑡)𝜓(𝑀𝑡)   (3) 
 
where 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) governs the process of technological diffusion while 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) − 𝐴𝑡 represents 
technological advancement associated with the transmission of FDI-generated externalities; 
𝑘𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡/𝐿𝑡, the ratio of capital to labour;  is a function which embodies the influence 
of foreign capital, including FDI (with Inada conditions φ′(∙) > 0, φ′′(∙) < 0 implying that 
the existence of foreign capital is necessary for spillover through technology leakage, while 
the extent of leakage is diminishing); and  is the function of domestic financial 
development (M). In specifying equation (3), we make two crucial assumptions. First, we 
relax the original assumption in the models of Kinoshita and Lu (2006) and Hsu and Wu 
(2006) that the entire capital is foreign, and instead regard capital 𝐾𝑡 as a combination of 




always bring their entire capital from abroad, and their ability to also raise capital from local 
financial markets can be regarded as part of domestic capital.3 Foreign capital in this form 
augments domestic sources of investment, besides having potentially positive spillover 
effects on domestic factor productivity and knowledge capital. Second, the process of 
technological diffusion embodied in 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) is a function of the state of the economy so that 
positive spillover benefits from FDI are realised only under favourable local conditions, such 
as the level of debt being below a certain threshold. Formally, 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) > 𝐴𝑡 if 𝜄 < 𝜄
𝛾, which 
represents the threshold condition.  
Intertemporal optimisation under a competitive environment4 leads to equilibrium output 
per capita which can be expressed as a function of the production parameter (𝛽), the domestic 


































𝜓(𝑀𝑡−1)}  (5) 
 
From equation (5) it can be seen that growth rate is a function of the level of external debt (E) 
the economy owes to the rest of the world, which is influenced by financial repression (𝜃). In 
this model, as expressed by equation (3), aggregate economic growth is assumed to be 
positively influenced by technological diffusion and spillovers associated with FDI inflows. 
                                                 
3 See Agbloyor et al. (2013) for a discussion of how MNEs conduct their business using host country banking systems. The 
relationship between FDI and host countries’ financial market is well documented by several studies (e.g., Alfaro et al., 
2010).  
4 The assumption of perfect competition in optimisation is for illustrative purposes; in reality, of course, this may not be 




However, the distortionary impact of financial repression, in terms of its ability to reduce (or 
liquidate) the real debt burden, can effectively constrain the positive impact of FDI on growth 
by influencing the behaviour of MNEs and, consequently, their ability to contribute to host 
country development. As derived in Appendix I, the FDI-induced growth effect is positive 
only if the threshold condition 𝜄 < 𝜄𝛾 holds, not otherwise.   
There are several possible reasons underlying the channel (of financial repression) 
through which a high debt burden could limit the FDI induced spillover effects on growth. 
For example, MNEs might be forced to curtail their operations in the host economy if 
prospects of negative real returns from investment are anticipated due to higher inflation.5 
More specifically, as shown in the above model, foreign affiliates that make use of local 
financial markets to raise capital find that their returns are effectively taxed through financial 
repression, and consequently they are more likely to scale back their operations and limit 
their interactions with local entrepreneurs. Thus, gains from FDI through such linkages are 
likely to be affected. Furthermore, irrespective of the financing conditions, the prospects of 
higher costs or lower competitiveness in the host economy may restrict foreign firms’ 
reliance on domestic suppliers for (intermediate) inputs, thus limiting spillovers via backward 
linkages (Amendolagine et al., 2013; Damijan et al., 2003). Similarly, gains through forward 
linkages could be reduced if foreign firms find it less profitable to maintain their operations 
supplying intermediate goods and services to domestic firms. In general, the distortionary 
impact of financial repression that reduces the scope of engagement of foreign firms with 
local firms is likely to limit the potential gains from FDI inflows that come through spillovers 
or technological diffusion. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that high external debt has an 
adverse impact on the FDI-growth relationship. 
The negative influence of debt overhang on the FDI-growth nexus, however, can be 
appreciably lower in countries with higher levels of financial development. Incorporated in 
                                                 
5 In addition, as argued earlier, debt overhang increases the sovereign risk of host countries, which is likely to lower their 
international credit ratings and deter foreign investors and firms from investing in local markets. Credit rating agencies (e.g. 
Moody, S&P, and Fitch) consider the position of a country’s public finances as an important factor for assessment of its 




the above model is the influence of financial development, the importance of which can be 
considered in terms of both its role in enabling FDI to promote growth as well as in 
mitigating the adverse effect of external debt on FDI. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) 
present evidence to suggest that countries with high levels of financial repression tend to be 
less financially developed. As a corollary, this implies that increasing financial development 
would undermine the ability of authorities to use financial repression as a means to reduce the 
level of external debt.6 Furthermore, Haslag and Koo (1999) provide evidence to support the 
view that financial development serves to weaken the link between financial repression and 
growth. Although the impact of increased financial development on FDI-induced growth 
cannot be unambiguously determined in the presence of debt overhang ex ante, our analysis 
of the derivation of this effect – as formally shown in Appendix I – suggests that it can be 
positive under certain circumstances. 
Taking these considerations into account suggests a complex nonlinear relationship 
characterising the link between FDI and economic growth, although it seems plausible to 
infer from the above theoretical analysis that: (i) debt overhang acts as a contingency factor 
inhibiting the positive influence of FDI on growth; and (ii) greater financial development 
serves to mitigate this negative effect while improving the host country’s absorptive capacity 
to yield growth benefits from FDI. Collectively, (i) and (ii) form the threshold relations 
derived from equation (5) that we subject to empirical scrutiny, giving us two testable 
hypotheses. These threshold conditions are illustrated within the Hansen multiple threshold 
estimation technique described in the next section. 
 
                                                 
6 Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) present an endogenous growth model with money demand to show that financial 
development reduces the inflation tax base and therefore the ability of authorities to collect seigniorage from higher money 




4 | METHODOLOGY 
To test the implications of the theoretical model we apply a multiple threshold estimation 
technique to determine, first, the existence of a debt threshold effect in the FDI-growth nexus 
and, second, whether such a threshold is only binding under a low financial development 
regime (or, alternatively, not binding under a high financial development regime). The latter 
requires determining a financial development threshold beforehand.  
As noted above, several studies (e.g. Alfaro et al., 2004; Borensztein et al., 1998; Okada 
& Samreth, 2014) have used interaction terms in regression models to determine the 
existence of threshold effects and thus the role for spillover effects in the FDI-growth link. 
However, as emphasised by Girma (2005), Azman-Saini et al. (2010a) and Slesman et al. 
(2015), this modelling strategy has the drawback of imposing the a priori restriction that 
spillovers are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) with absorptive capacity. A more 
flexible estimation method is proposed by Hansen (1996, 2000), which entails determining 
threshold effects through a sample decomposition based on dividing the data sample 
according to the categories (debt regimes) chosen. This method, therefore, allows for 
parameter heterogeneity through sample-splitting by regime rather than by including 
interaction terms in estimation. Another advantage of Hansen’s method is that a more 
accurate threshold effect can be obtained from estimation, while the traditional approach 
using interaction terms can only provide an approximation of the threshold value. We 
therefore use Hansen’s method for our empirical analysis. 




′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,          𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾                                                                                              
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏2





where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents GDP growth per capita; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 stands for all the independent variables 
including FDI; and 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 is treated as a threshold variable conditioning the impact of FDI 
on economic growth. Subsequently, in our analysis, to test whether the debt threshold is 
binding (not binding) in the low (high) financial development regime, we postulate the 
following model where financial development (FIN hereafter) is introduced as a threshold 
variable in place of DEBT, viz., 
  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌1
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,          𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜎                                                                                              
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌2
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,          𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 > 𝜎                                                                                     (7) 
 
In estimating the model represented by either (6) or (7), the sample is effectively split into 
two regimes, depending on whether the value of DEBT /FIN is above a threshold level 𝛾/𝜎 
or not (thus distinguishing between high and low regimes in accordance with the threshold 
values of DEBT or FIN). Focusing on (6) for expositional convenience, to represent the 
model in a form of a single equation with the ‘sample-split’, we let 𝛿𝑛 = 𝜏2 − 𝜏1 denote the 
threshold effect, indicating a ‘small threshold’ when 𝛿𝑛 approaches zero. Now introduce a 
dummy variable 𝑑𝑖𝑡(𝛾) = {𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾}, where {∙} is the indicator function. Then, set 
𝑥𝑖𝑡(𝛾) = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡(𝛾) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑖𝑡(𝛾) + 𝑖𝑡, where 𝜏 = 𝜏2. The unified equation 
now allows for the subset parameters to differ between the two regimes.  
The first step in the estimation is to calculate the sum of squared residuals (RSS). The 




𝑡=1 = 𝑆𝑛(?̂?(𝛾), 𝛿(𝛾), 𝛾).  𝑆𝑛(𝛾) is linear in 𝜏 and 𝛿, 
when 𝛾 is conditional on a specific threshold value (𝛾0) which yields the conditional OLS 
estimators ?̂?(𝛾) and 𝛿(𝛾). In order to obtain the threshold point 𝛾, the estimation requires 
minimisation of 𝑆𝑛(𝛾): 𝛾 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝛾0 min 𝑆𝑛(𝛾).  The way to find the minimised RSS is 
through a grid search on 667 quintiles from 0.15 percent to 99.85 percent with every quintile 




  The second step is to test the hypothesis of no threshold. In this case, the null is 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2, against the alternative which effectively suggests that the specification is 
nonlinear. Hansen (1996) demonstrates that calculating a bootstrapped p-value is 
asymptotically valid. The null of ‘no nonlinearity’ (i.e. no threshold) is rejected when the p-
value is below the desired critical value (e.g. 0.05 or 0.1). The bootstrapped p-value is 
determined by setting the number of replications (e.g. 1,000). 
The next step, after determining the existence of a threshold, is to form the confidence 
interval for the threshold parameter. The null hypothesis in this case is 𝐻0: 𝛾 = 𝛾0, and the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic is computed as 𝐿𝑅𝑛(𝛾) = 𝑛
𝑆𝑛(𝛾)−𝑆𝑛(?̂?)
𝑆𝑛(?̂?)
. The null is rejected 
when the value of the LR statistic exceeds the critical value of the underlying distribution. 
However, the LR test does not have a standard chi-squared distribution asymptotically. The 
approach to testing is to check against the correct critical value from the table of asymptotic 
critical values provided in Hansen (2000: 582).  
The final step in Hansen’s estimation procedure is to compute the parameter estimates 
and their standard errors. We use the heteroscedasticity corrected White-robust standard 
errors to test the significance of the estimates. 
 
5 | DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 | Data  
We use an unbalanced panel of data for the estimation of the Hansen threshold model. The 
data are compiled for 39 developing countries over the time period 1984-2010. The sample 
period is dictated by data availability. Specifically, a start date at 1984 is motivated by the 
fact that institution data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) only go back to 
1984. The end date of 2010 is justified by the fact that data for the human capital variable 
from the updated Barro and Lee’s (2013) dataset, extends only up to 2010 (and the alternative 




values for low and lower-middle income countries). The list of countries included in the 
sample is given in Appendix II.7 We limit our sample to less developed economies (classified 
as low and lower-middle income categories according to the World Bank classification of 
countries) since traditionally these countries have relied on external debt and FDI as a means 
to promote economic growth. Furthermore, restricting our choice to these income groups of 
countries reduces the degree of heterogeneity commonly associated with using cross-country 
data while ensuring that there is sufficient variation in debt levels across the countries. 
Additionally, rather than employ cross-sectional data averaged over the entire time period (as 
used in some recent studies applying threshold methods – see, e.g. Kim et al., 2013), we use 
panel data with annual frequency as well as five-year averages because debt levels tend to 
vary significantly over time even within the same country while other variables can be 
changing more slowly or smoothly (e.g. institutional quality). The use of panel data (with 
sufficiently large cross-section and time dimensions) also provides us with a larger sample 
size which is likely to give more precise and realistic threshold values compared to using 
cross-sectional data.      
Economic growth, the dependent variable, is represented by the growth of real GDP per 
capita (measured in US dollars at constant prices in 2005). FDI, the main independent 
variable, is measured by the ratio of net FDI inflows to GDP (as is customary, see e.g. 
Cushman & De Vita, 2017). External debt (as a proportion of GDP) is used as the threshold 
variable. The data for these variables, as well as for inflation and trade openness, are sourced 
from UNCTAD.8      
 Following previous studies, we include a set of control variables in the threshold 
regressions to represent the influence of financial repression, financial development (also 
                                                 
7 Our sample strategy was to begin with a larger set of less developed economies but owing to many missing values over the 
time period considered we ended up with a final sample of 39 countries. 
  





used as a threshold variable subsequently), financial crisis, human capital, trade openness, 
institutions and conflict.9   
 Financial repression - which provides a channel through which external debt affects the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth (as illustrated by our theoretical model) - is 
proxied by inflation. Although there are more direct measures of financial repression (such as 
reserve ratios and interest rate controls) lack of available data for low income countries 
means that we have to rely on the inflation rate (measured by the annual change in consumer 
price index, CPI) as a more indirect measure of financial repression. As argued by Haslag and 
Koo (1999) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), inflation is a reasonable proxy for 
financial repression as it serves to reduce the real burden of debt the government owes to the 
private sector. However, as a robustness check, we consider interest rate spread between the 
savings and lending rates as an alternative proxy.  
Financial development, a determinant of growth in its own right (Herwartz & Walle, 
2014), represents the absorptive capacity of a country to assimilate the growth benefits from 
inward FDI (Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010; Hermes & Lensink, 2003). We capture the effect of 
financial development using M2, a measure of money in circulation outside banks including 
time (savings and foreign currency) deposits. As part of robustness, we also consider the ratio 
of private credit to GDP, reflecting the availability of domestic credit provided by financial 
institutions to the private sector. 
We also account for the effect of financial crises using a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 for the year a country experienced a financial crisis and 0 otherwise, as reported by 
Laeven and Valencia (2012). Financial crises, which affected a handful of developing 
countries over the sample period (the major episodes being the 1997-98 East Asian crisis and 
the 2007-08 crisis), constitute a major disruption for the affected economies and, owing to 
capital flight, for their external debt obligations. For example, Korea experienced a reduction 
                                                 
9 Other control variables could not be entertained owing to data deficiencies, such as government expenditure for which 
there were too many missing values for less developed countries (LDCs). While we use an unbalanced panel, it was sensible 




of one third of its short-term debts which stopped rolling over in 1998 after the 1997 crisis 
(Radelet & Sachs, 1998).  
Additional growth determinants typically used as control variables (see, e.g. De Vita & 
Kyaw, 2009) include initial GDP, human capital measured by the average year of schooling 
(Barro & Lee, 2013), and trade openness (the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to 
GDP). Furthermore, given that some developing countries experienced a high propensity for 
civil conflict (considered to be harmful to economic growth), following Borensztein et al. 
(1998) we control for the effect of conflict using the Armed Conflict Dataset of the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), with scores ranging from 0-3, representing different 
intensities of conflict from low to high. 
Finally, following Slesman et al. (2015), we include a set of three institutional quality 
controls to represent the effects of democracy, rule of law, and control of corruption, using 
data from the ICRG. Not only do institutions influence growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005), they 
may also have an influence through financial development (Fergusson, 2006). Table 1 lists 
each variable used in the empirical analysis, its definition and associated source. 
 Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of the data for the full sample. External debt 
(as a percentage of GDP) averages around 57 percent with a large variance and a spread of 
values ranging from 10 percent (for Uganda in 2006) to a mighty 319 percent (for Nicaragua 
in 1994). FDI inflows (percentage of GDP) average around 2.3 percent but also vary 
considerably across the sample (from -15 percent for Sierra Leone in 1986 to 42 percent for 
Liberia in 2010). The mean of real GDP growth (per capita) over the sample is 1.76 percent 
with a range across the panel exceeding 46 percent (from -25 percent for Sierra Leone in 
1996 to +21 percent for Congo in 1999). Economic growth also displays considerable 
variation across the countries. Countries’ mean growth rates range from –3.34 percent (DR 
Congo) to 7.54 percent (Myanmar). Significantly, we find that 23 percent of the countries 
average negative growth over the sample period. Other variables (including inflation and the 
measures of financial development), as reported in Table 2, reveal substantive differences 




       [Tables 1 and 2 here]  
 
5.2 | Empirical Results  
5.2.1 | Threshold effect of external debt 
The first inference drawn from the theoretical analysis is a debt contingency effect which 
limits the positive influence of FDI on growth. Table 3 reports the basic set of results 
determining the threshold effect of external debt. In total, two set of results are presented, the 
first using annual data and the second with five-year non-overlapping averages. The 
regressions include relevant proxies representing the independent influence of FDI, financial 
repression, financial development and other control variables (initial GDP, human capital, 
conflict, trade openness, institutional quality and crisis) which are common in all the 
estimations.10   
            [Table 3 here]  
 
In both sets of regressions, the bootstrapped p-value, determined with 1,000 replications 
and a trimming percentage of 0.15 percent, confirms that the null of no threshold is rejected. 
Hence, our findings suggest that a debt threshold exists and the sample is therefore split into 
low-debt and high-debt regimes on the basis of the value of the threshold for further 
estimation. In both cases, the sample-split reveals a higher number of observations in the first 
sub-sample (low debt regime) than in the second sub-sample (high debt regime).  
In Model 1 (Table 3), estimated with annual data, the threshold point is at a value of 
-0.3826 which, interpreted in terms of the debt value, is around 68 percent of GDP. The 
estimated results for the sub-samples (low-debt and high-debt regimes) show that FDI has a 
positive and significant influence on economic growth when the external debt threshold is 
below 68 percent of GDP. The results indicate that, below this threshold level (low-debt 
                                                 
10 We also entertained variants of the model specifications which excluded the effect of institutions and/or financial 





regime), a 1 percent rise in inward FDI increases the growth rate of GDP per capita by around 
0.19 percent; whereas if the level of debt/GDP is above 68 percent (high-debt regime), the 
FDI effect is insignificant. In both regimes (i.e. regardless of the level of external debt) 
inflation has a significant and negative impact on growth, while rule of law has a significant 
and positive effect on growth. Furthermore, in the low debt regime, initial GDP and crisis 
have a negative effect on growth but financial development (M2) and democracy have a 
positive effect. In the high debt regime, trade openness has a positive impact on growth but 
inflation and human capital exert a negative impact on growth. 
In Model 2, which utilises five-year non-overlapping averaged data, the results do not 
change much as the threshold of debt/GDP is around 69 percent (with a threshold point 
estimate of -0.4866) and FDI exerts a significantly positive effect on growth below that 
threshold, but otherwise its effect is insignificant (in the high debt regime). The results 
indicate that, in the low-debt regime, a 1 percent rise in FDI increases the growth rate of GDP 
per capita by 0.07 percent over the five-year period. The control variables exhibit similar 
effects as in Model 1, with few exceptions. For instance, human capital has a significant but 
positive impact on growth in the low debt regime although retains its negative effect in the 
high debt regime; and rule of law exerts a positive effect on growth in the high debt regime 
only. 
Taken together, the results confirm the existence of a debt contingency effect in the 
relationship between FDI and growth. The positive impact of FDI on growth is significant 
and robust as long as the level of external debt is below the threshold rate, estimated to be 
around 68-69 percent of GDP. When external debt exceeds this threshold, the effect of FDI 
on growth is not statistically significant. Among the control variables, the negative effect of 
inflation on growth stands out as being the most significant. These results provide support for 
the prevalence of a financial repression effect having a direct negative impact on growth. It is 
also noteworthy that financial crisis undermines growth in the low debt regime, but its 
influence is not significant in the high debt regime. An explanation for this seemingly 




debt regime and, therefore, the crisis effect on growth could be negligible. The results also 
indicate that the direct effect of financial development on growth is not robustly significant, 
although this is not inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of the model which suggests 
that its role is more indirect in terms of enabling the FDI-induced growth effect via its 
influence on the absorptive capacity of recipient economies.   
5.2.2 | Threshold effect of financial development versus external debt 
A second inference drawn from the theoretical model is that financial development serves to 
mitigate the negative influence of the debt contingency effect on the FDI-growth nexus. As a 
consequence, we infer that the effect of debt overhang on the FDI-growth relationship 
diminishes with increased financial development. In turn, FDI should have a more significant 
impact on growth in financially more developed regimes than in financially less developed 
regimes. 
To test this assertion empirically, we proceed as follows. First, we determine the absence 
of a threshold effect of debt on growth if financial development is high enough. Second, we 
check that FDI has a significant and positive effect on growth in financially more developed 
regimes. Testing these effects using the Hansen approach requires that financial development 
(FIN) is treated as a threshold variable, as given by equation (7). Once a threshold of FIN is 
determined (i.e. the null of linearity - of the threshold of FIN - is rejected), the sample can be 
split according to high- and low-FIN regimes. Next, to test the null hypothesis of no threshold 
effect of debt in the high-FIN regime, attention is focused solely on the high-FIN sub-sample 
to determine the existence (or lack) of a debt threshold.  
 Given our primary interest in determining threshold values of FIN while using the same 
data and model specification as in Table 3, we report only the p-value of each threshold in 
Table 4. The proxy for FIN is M2, and the evidence shown in the upper panel of Table 4 
confirms the existence of a threshold effect of FIN, which is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level on both sets of data. Accordingly, the sample is split into low- and high-FIN 




not binding in the high-FIN regime as the bootstrapped p-values are above 0.1. This result 
confirms that the influence of the external debt threshold limiting the transmission of FDI 
effects on growth diminishes as financial development increases. Furthermore, the estimation 
results confirm that FDI has a positive and statistically significant effect on growth in the 
high-FIN regime but an insignificant effect in the low-FIN regime.  
 
          [Table 4 here]  
 
Collectively, the results (of Tables 3 and 4) confirm the existence of a debt contingency 
effect in the FDI-growth nexus, revealing a positive association between the two variables 
below a debt-to-GDP ratio of 68-69 percent but an insignificant effect above that threshold. 
Additionally, the results confirm that a higher level of financial development can mitigate the 
debt overhang effect on the FDI-growth nexus. These findings indicate that financial 
development serves as a catalyst representing the absorptive capacity which host countries 
should aim to achieve as a minimum threshold level before they can accrue growth benefits 
from FDI inflows. 
5.2.3 | Robustness check 
To check the robustness of our results we consider alternative proxies for financial 
development and financial repression, represented by private credit over GDP and interest 
rate spread (between deposit and lending rates), respectively. Data availability for these 
measures (both collected from the World Bank) restricts the sample size for robustness 
estimation. Additionally, to account for potential endogeneity of some explanatory variables 
(such as FDI, financial development and trade openness) we use the Caner and Hansen 
(2004) threshold estimation method which allows for the use of instrumental variables.  
 Previous studies (Alfaro et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2013) have treated FDI as potentially 
endogenous since fast growing economies tend to attract more FDI inflows. Furthermore, the 




variables are also influenced by economic growth and those factors (such as macro policies 
and legal foundations) which are not accounted for in the regressions. We use lagged values 
of FDI, trade openness and financial development, as well as initial GDP, real interest rate, 
legal origins (British and French) and population as instruments. Our criteria for the validity 
of instruments is based on using: (i) the Hansen’s J test to check that the chosen instruments 
are orthogonal to the error terms; and (ii) the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic to check 
whether there is a weak instruments problem.11 
 Table 5 reports the main findings. First, the results indicate that the choice of instruments 
is valid given that the p-value of the Hansen’s J test is greater than 0.05, and there is no weak 
instruments problem since the F value is larger than 10. Second, the p-values of nonlinearity 
confirm the existence of a debt threshold which is found to be around 61-68 percent of GDP. 
Finally, FDI has a positive and significant effect on growth in the low debt regime while its 
effect remains insignificant in the high debt regime.  
 
         [Table 5 here]  
 
To sum up, our results are consistent and robust with regard to using the Caner and 
Hansen (2004) threshold estimation method to address the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in the threshold estimation and after introducing alternative proxies to 
represent the effects of financial development and financial repression.  
 
6 | CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a theoretical mechanism to allow for the influence of debt 
overhang in a model of FDI-growth and shown that the distortionary impact of financial 
repression (as a means to reduce the burden of debt) can limit the positive effect of FDI on 
                                                 





growth. We also conduct empirical analysis to highlight the existence of a debt contingency 
effect in the FDI-growth relationship. 
Using threshold estimations on panel data for 39 less developed economies, and 
controlling for a well-established set of growth determinants, our empirical results reveal a 
robust influence of a debt threshold effect on the association between FDI and economic 
growth. A threshold level of external debt is found to be around 61-69 percent of GDP 
(consistent across different models) below which FDI exerts a positive and significant effect 
on growth. Such a growth-enhancing effect diminishes when economies face an increasing 
burden of external debt that goes beyond that threshold level. 
Our results also indicate that the external debt threshold effect is non-existent in 
financially more developed regimes relative to financially under-developed regimes, 
implying that increasing financial development serves to mitigate the effect of the debt 
threshold on the FDI-growth nexus. This highlights a role for financial development 
absorptive capacity in terms of enhancing the capability of FDI to promote growth. 
The main policy implications of our findings are that: (i) host countries should avoid an 
excessive build-up of external debt as a crucial requirement for developing economies that 
rely on FDI as a catalyst for economic growth and development; and (ii) development, 
concomitantly, needs to cater for improving the financial absorptive capacity of the recipient 
economies to accrue growth-enhancing benefits from FDI. 
A final caveat is in order. Despite a large sample, our estimations were constrained by 
data availability, with a sample period ending at 2010. Data permitting, future studies could 
profitably expand our analysis by investigating how the FDI-debt-growth relationship fared 
in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the subsequent global recession. Future 
research could also specifically consider the effect on the FDI-growth nexus of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and related Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI), both aimed at relieving the world’s poorest countries of unmanageable debt 
burdens. This extension appears particularly opportune given that nearly half of the countries 
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Assume that private agents with identical consumption-investment behaviours maximise their 
utility over two periods. In the first period, agents receive their incomes (considered as fixed 
and exogenous after-tax-revenue), invest in domestic and foreign assets, and use the rest for 
consumption. Agents then utilise their second-period income and after tax return from first-
period investment for consumption. It is assumed that the country is small and so its savings 
or investment cannot affect the world interest rate. Government expenditure increases private 
agents’ utility, but it enters exogenously as an additive function as private agents cannot 
control it. Government raises its revenue through financial repression, represented as a tax θ 
on the value of foreign investment.12  
 The representative private agent’s utility U and consumption in the two periods, 𝐶1 and 
𝐶2, are given as follows: 
 
𝑈 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐶1𝐶2
𝑈𝑖(𝐶1𝐶2) + 𝑈𝑔(𝐺)    (1) 
 
𝐶1 = 𝑊1 − (𝐷 + 𝐹)       (2) 
 
𝐶2 = 𝑊2 + (1 + 𝑟
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝐹 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐷   (3) 
 
where 𝑊1 and 𝑊2 are the private agent’s incomes in the two periods; 𝐺 is government 
spending; 𝑟 and 𝑟∗ are the domestic and world interest rates respectively; 𝐷 and 𝐹 are the 
holdings of domestic and foreign assets by private agents; and 𝜃 is revenue (tax) from 
financial repression. For simplicity, uncertainty and transaction costs are not taken into 
account. Also, for same reason, there is no distinction between interest and principal 
                                                 
12 To simplify the model, the only source of tax revenue for government expenditure is through financial repression which 




repayment. Private agents require the same return from both types of assets, hence 𝐷 and 𝐹 
are perfect substitutes. 
 Assuming perfect capital mobility, investors require that after tax returns on domestic 
and foreign assets are equal so that equilibrium in the private agents’ portfolio implies that: 
 
(1 + 𝑟∗)(1 − 𝜃) = 1 + 𝑟    (4) 
 
This suggests that the tax 𝜃 on foreign asset returns proportionally reduces the interest paid 
on domestic debt, and financial repression therefore exerts a distortion which drives the 
domestic interest rates below the world interest rate.  
 Maximising utility with respect to consumption in equations (1)-(3) yields the first-order 
condition: 
 
𝑈1(𝐶1𝐶2) = (1 + 𝑟
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝑈2(𝐶1𝐶2)     (5) 
 
where 𝑈1 and 𝑈2 are the marginal utilities with respect to the first and second period 
consumptions, respectively. This condition highlights the impact of financial repression on 
the intertemporal terms of trade faced by private agents.13  
 Assuming that government expenditure is financed by domestic borrowing (𝐷) and 
external debt (𝐸), the respective budget constraints in the first and second periods are: 
 
𝐺 = 𝐷 + 𝐸    (6) 
 
(1 + 𝑟∗)𝐸 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐷 = (1 + 𝑟∗) 𝜃𝐹   (7) 
 
                                                 
13 The model here does not seek to explain the relationship between financial repression and cost of distortion on the optimal 




Equation (7) illustrates that income from the financial repression tax has to be equal to the 
cost of government’s domestic and foreign debts. Using (4), (6) and (7), we get 
 
𝐺 = 𝜃(𝐹 + 𝐷)   (8) 
 
Equation (8) implies that the distortionary effect of interest rate renders government an 
income which is proportional to the total holdings of assets by private agents in the first time 
period. More importantly, the model highlights that governments can exercise the means of 
financial repression to affect foreign investment by driving a wedge between domestic and 
foreign interest rates, rather than rely on levying a tax on private agents’ income from 
investing in foreign assets. Therefore, assuming that 𝐺 = 𝜃𝐷 approximately holds and using 
(6), the government’s budget constraint is transformed into: 
 
𝐸 + 𝐷 = 𝜃𝐷  (9) 
 
For simplicity, we normalise government expenditure to be unity, so that the relationship 





    (10) 
 
Turning to the relationship between FDI and economic growth, we assume that each firm has 






  (11) 
 
where 𝐴t stands for technology; 𝐾t denotes capital (both domestic and foreign) and we 




𝐿t labour is entirely supplied by residents in domestic country; and 𝛽 ∈ (0,1). Following 
Kinoshita and Lu (2016) and Hsu and Wu (2006), assume technological progress of domestic 
country is driven by international diffusion of foreign technology, which in our context 
measures as the function of FDI externality and local economic conditions: 
 
𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑡 + (𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) − 𝐴𝑡)𝜑(𝑘𝑡)𝜓(𝑀𝑡)  (12) 
 
Assuming a linear additive utility function of the OLG model (for simplicity, the model here 
does not include the utility gain from government expenditure): 
 
𝑈 = ln 𝐶1 + 𝛿 ln 𝐶2  (13) 
 





= (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥)𝑊1  (14) 
 
The optimal consumption path (𝐶1, 𝐶2) is derived by maximising (13) subject to (14) to 



























Given that the host country has domestic and foreign capital, and MNEs can borrow from the 




− 1. Then, combining (11), (13), and (17), the equilibrium capital and output 





























To obtain the growth rate of output per capita 𝑔𝑡, divide both sides of equation (19) by 𝑦𝑡−1 
and take the logarithmic form, substituting also for 𝐴𝑡 using (12): 
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2 − 𝛽
1 − 𝛽




∗ (𝜄) − 𝐴𝑡−1)𝜑(𝑘𝑡−1)𝜓(𝑀𝑡−1)]          (20𝑎)        
 


















𝜓(𝑀𝑡−1)}  (20b) 
 
In deriving (20a,b), we have used the fact that 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥
𝑦
) = 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝑥−𝑦
𝑦






is foreign capital and 𝑘𝑡
𝑑 is domestic capital. Differentiating (20a) 
with respect to 𝑘𝑡−1
𝑓



















∗ (𝜄) − 𝐴𝑡−1]𝜑(𝑘𝑡−1
𝑓
+ 𝑘𝑡−1
𝑑 )𝜓(𝑀𝑡−1)} (1 − 𝛽)
             (21) 
 
Given 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) > 𝐴𝑡  if 𝜄 < 𝜄
𝛾, it follows that 
∂𝑔𝑡
∂𝑘𝑡−1
𝑓 > 0 provided the threshold condition holds. 
Differentiating further with respect to 𝑘𝑡−1
𝑓
 yields a second-order condition that is negative, 
given that φ′′(∙) < 0 by the Inada conditions. Note that the expression in curly brackets in 
the denominator of (21) must be positive as it is the argument of the logarithmic function in 
(20a). This allows for the possibility that FDI spillovers can be negative but only in a limited 
sense when the debt threshold condition is not met so that 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) ≤ 𝐴𝑡 (𝜄 > 𝜄
𝛾), in which case 
the FDI-induced growth effect is not positive, though the adverse impact on growth could be 
mitigated through increased financial development. To illustrate the latter effect requires 
establishing a second-order partial condition by differentiating (21) with respect to 𝑀𝑡−1 and 


















∗ (𝜄) − 𝐴𝑡−1]𝜑(𝑘𝑡−1
𝑓
+ 𝑘𝑡−1
𝑑 )𝜓(𝑀𝑡−1)} (1 − 𝛽)}
2      
(22) 
 
Although the sign of this second-order condition (22) cannot be unambiguously 
determined ex ante, it is positive if 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) ≤ 𝐴𝑡 and 𝜓
′(𝑀𝑡−1) < 0, which is plausible under a 
high-debt, financially repressive regime that relies on increasing money supply growth to 
reduce the real burden of debt. The condition is also positive if 𝐴𝑡
∗(𝜄) > 𝐴𝑡 and 𝜓
′(𝑀𝑡−1) >
0, which is more likely in low-debt regimes as financial development is focused on 
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TABLE 1 Variables, definition and source 
Variable Definition Source 
Economic 
growth 
Growth of real GDP per capita (measured in US dollars at constant 
prices in 2005). 
World Bank 
FDI Ratio of inward FDI flows to GDP. FDI inflows are recorded on net 
basis (capital transactions’ credits less debits between direct 
investors and their foreign affiliates) and can be negative when 






External debt The ratio of external debt to GDP, representing the indebtedness 
level of the host economies. 
UNCTAD 
Human capital Educational attainment, measured by average years of schooling 
(for population aged 15 and over). 
Barro and Lee 
(2013) 
Civil conflict An index ranging from 0 to 3, representing different intensities of 




Initial GDP Initial level of GDP. UNCTAD 
Financial 
crises 
Captured by a dummy variable which takes value 1 for the year a 





Measured using M2 which represents money in circulation outside 
banks including time (savings and foreign currency) deposits. As 
robustness, we use the ratio of private credit to GDP which refers to 
the availability of domestic credit provided by financial institutions 
to the private sector. 
World Bank 
Rule of law An index ranging from 0 to 6, representing the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system as well as the popular observance of 




Democracy An index ranging from 0 to 6, representing the level of democracy 




An index of corruption control, ranging from 0 to 5, representing 
the level (actual or potential) of corruption in various forms 




Proxied by inflation (annual change in consumer price index, CPI). 
As a robustness check, interest rate spread between savings and 












TABLE 2 Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth per capita (%) 856 1.7609 4.3237 -24.7831 20.6168 
FDI (% of GDP) 911 2.2954 6.6166 -65.4109 85.9631 
Debt (% of GDP) 911 57.0323 42.4887 10.0009 319.2577 
Human capital 782 4.3166 1.9894 0.5636 11.1 
Conflict 911 0.7146 1.0710 0 3 
Crisis 911 0.0472 0.2122 0 1 
M2 (% of GDP) 899 21.5692 32.8815 -81.702 544.2376 
Private credit (% of GDP) 883 19.1298 12.4869 0.7241 103.6323 
Democracy 738 3.0318 1.4245 0 6 
The rule of law 738 2.65378 1.0801 0 6 
Corruption 815 2.207466 0.99109 0 5 
Inflation (%) 911 0.8153 9.2609 -0.1145 237.731 






TABLE 3 Threshold estimations using external debt as threshold 






p-value of threshold 0.002*** 0.013** 
  q<=-0.3826 q>-0.3826 q<=-0.4866 q>-0.4866 
FDI 0.1642*** 0.0809 0.0715*** 0.0507 
  (0.0376) (0.0684) (0.0238) (0.0327) 
Initial GDP -0.0040*** -0.0175 -0.0046** -0.0211 
 (0.0015) (0.0148) (0.0020) (0.0269) 
Human capital  0.0037 -0.0275*** 0.0100** -0.0311*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0081) (0.0048) (0.0112) 
Conflict 0.0055 0.0035 0.0057 0.0108 
  (0.0133) (0.0066) (0.0167) (0.0893) 
Trade openness -0.0006 0.0289** 0.0013 0.0345 
  0.0053 (0.0136) (0.0072) (0.0359) 
Crisis -0.0295** 0.0117 0.0560 0.0118 
 (0.0126) (0.0164) (0.2697) (0.0109) 
Inflation -0.0091** -0.0179* -0.0244*** -0.0138 
  (0.0041) (0.0103) (0.0046) (0.0129) 
M2 0.0309** 0.0099 0.0509*** 0.0126 
  (0.0128) (0.0166) (0.0093) (0.0117) 
Rule of law 0.0066*** 0.0227*** 0.0029 0.0320*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0057) (0.0022) (0.0117) 
Democracy 0.0005*** -0.0064 -0.0012 -0.0048 
  (0.0016) (0.0048) (0.0023) (0.0057) 
Control of corruption -0.0022 0.0042 0.0014 0.0008 
 (0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0057) 
Constant -0.0542 -0.3829*** 0.0201 -0.4098** 
  (0.0353) (0.1049) (0.0520) (0.1799) 
N 545 164 94 35 
Note: ***p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Estimation is by Hansen’s (2000) 
method. The dependent variable is per capital GDP growth (log differenced). All explanatory 
variables (except institutions, conflict and crisis) are represented in natural logarithm form. Robust 
standard errors are reported (in parenthesis below coefficient estimates) to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. ‘q’ is the threshold value determined by using external debt, which represents 



































p-value of  
FIN threshold  
0.000 *** 0.001*** 
Regimes low-FIN high-FIN low-FIN high-FIN 
FDI 0.0702 0.1145*** 0.0524 0.0543** 
 (0.0573) (0.0061) (0.0424) (0.0218) 
N 524 185 102 27 
p-value of  
debt threshold  
 0.247  0.595 
Threshold effect of 
debt 
 No  No 
Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Estimation is by Hansen’s (2000) 
method. The dependent variable is GDP growth per capita. FIN is financial development 
(proxied by log of M2) used as a threshold to determine the split into high-FIN and low-FIN 
regimes. The other explanatory variables (the results of which are not reported apart from FDI) 
are the same as in Table 2. N denotes the number of observations. The p-value of debt 







TABLE 5 Threshold estimations for robustness check  
















FDI 0.1085*** 0.0913 0.2138*** 0.0309 
  (0.0409) (0.0132) (0.0338) (0.0640) 
N 276 100 79 27 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 66.387 11.042 


















Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Estimation is by Caner and 
Hansen’s (2004) method. The dependent variable is GDP growth per capita. The explanatory 
variables are the same as in Table 2 except that financial development and financial 
repression are proxied by private credit/GDP and interest rate spread, respectively. The 
estimates are reported for FDI only with heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
‘q’ is the threshold value determined by using external debt, which determines the point of 






FIGURE 1 FDI-Growth nexus with low and high indebtedness levels. Panel (a) illustrates 
the scatter plot with low indebtedness being based on country-year observations below the 
sample mean of external debt (as a percentage of GDP) of 57.03 percent. Panel (b) illustrates 
the scatter plot with high indebtedness being based on country-year observations above the 
sample mean of external debt (as a percentage of GDP) of 57.03 percent.   
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